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Something of an air of mystery and fiction pervades the subject of
escrows and obscures the question how far the transfer of title by
absolute deed may be suspended by parol conditions imposed on the
delivery. The desired effect of an escrow might, in many cases, be
more safely attained by writing the express condition precedent upon
the face of the deed. The instrument could then be delivered direct
to the grantee. Such express condition might be an event certain to
occur, as the death of the grantor, or an uncertain one, as the pay-
ment of the purchase price. If the condition is sure to happen, the
interest of the grantee would be either a vested remainder or a certain
executory interest; if uncertain, the interest given would be a con-
tingent executory future interest." The objection to inserting such
conditions precedent in deeds is of course that of introducing uncer-
tainty into the record title and the danger of casting a cloud on the
title of the grantor.
Conditional delivery is a device to put an absolute instrument into
effect subject to an external or parol condition precedent, and thus
to suspend the acquisition of the interest which the instrument pur-
ports to create. It is a substitute for an express condition precedent
on the face of the deed, and thus may conflict with the legislative
policy underlying the parol evidence rule.
2 In the case of a will, the
contingency must be- expressed in the instrument itself if its opera-
tion is to be made contingent.
3 In the case of a deed advantage is
taken of the fact that the instrument depends for its operation upon
delivery, a matter in pais.
The writing, signing and sealing of a document do not of them-
selves make it an "operative" instrument, not even. if it be attested
and acknowledged. Neither does the placing of a deed in the hands
of the grantee or obligee for a temporary or special purpose per se
constitute a delivery. Parol evidence is always admissible to show
that the document was never put into effect or beyond the rightful
control of the grantor, though it was handed over to the grantee him-
self. "In such cases the inquiry is: What was the intention of the
parties at the time? And that intention, when ascertained, must
' Thomas v. Williams (igo8) lO5 Minn. 88, n7 N. W. 55.
1 Taft v. Taft (1886) 59 Mich. 185, 26 N. W. 426.
'I Alexander, Commentary on Wills (917) secs. 102, 112; see Noble v. Fickes
(1907) 230 Ill. 594, 82 N. E. 95o.
[826]
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govern."4  The question of delivery is something aside from the
writing in an instrument. It depends upon proof by parol, and the
evidence arising from possession of the deed by the grantee may be
rebutted by parol.5 Parol evidence is always necessary to prove words
or acts of the maker expressing his intention to make the instrument
"operative."
Delivery is a declaration or expression of intent that an instrument
shall become binding or go into legal effect. Absolute delivery is a
declaration that the instrument shall go into effect presently accord-
ing to its terms. Conditional delivery is a declaration that the instru-
ment shall go into effect according to its terms at a future time. A
conditional delivery is one by which it is declared that the instrument
shall not produce the change of legal relations in respect to property
which it purports on its face to do, until something occurs. This
something may 'be an event certain or uncertain. "Conditional"
broadly includes suspension of effect not only by uncertain future acts
and events but also by certain or inevitable future events such as death.
In either case the declaration of intent may be regarded as an imme-
diately operative legal act, binding on the grantor and giving a present
interest to the grantee qualified by the parol condition.
If the condition upon which the deed is deposited is one certain to
occur, the delivery is usually regarded as not being conditional at
all.6 The authorities make much of the distinction between cases
where the delivery is made to depend upon the payment of money or
the happening of some uncertain contingency and cases where there
is no condition connected with a delivery except a future event sure
to occur, like the death of the grantor. It is generally held where a
deed is delivered to a third person to be handed to the grantee on the
grantor's death, that the deed will operate as a present conveyance.'
The deed is held to create immediately a vested future estate subject to
a life estate left by subtraction in the grantor. By the oral qualifica-
tion placed on the delivery, the grantor impliedly reserves to himself
a life estate just as he would by an express provision in the deed
suspending its operation until his death. Thus in Smith v. Smiths
deeds were deposited with an attorney of the grantor with written
directions for the depositary to deliver them "upon my death, so that
they may then take effect." It was held that this did not prevent the
present passing of title at the time of depositing the deeds, if on all
4 See .brdan v. Davis (1883) io8 Ill. 336; Wilson v. Wilson (1895) I58 III.
567, 41 N. E. lOO7; Sample v. Geathard (1917) 281 Ill. 79, 117 N. E. 718.
5lordan v. Davis, supra; NofftZ v. NofftZ (IgI) 290 Ill. 36, 42, 124 N. E. 838;
Pollock v. Glassell (1846, Va.) 2 Gratt. 439, 445.
'Prutsman v. Baker (1872) 30 Wis. 644, II Am. Rep. 592.
"Whitney v. Sherman (i9i8) i78 Calif. 435, 173 Pac. 931; Smith v. Smith
(1916) 173 Calif. 725, 161 Pac. 495; Hunt v. Wicht (1917) 174 Calif. 2o5, 162
Pac. 639, L. R. A. 1917C 961; Bullard v. Suedmeler (192o, Ill.) 126 N. E. 117.
a Supra.
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the evidence the directions referred to the time of enjoyment, rather
than to the passing of title?
In such cases the delivery is in terms conditional, yet since the
grantor has parted with control over the deed, and since the grantee's
rights are dependent only upon a certain future event, he may be
regarded as having a vested future estate, and the grantor's interest
may be regarded as being immediately cut down correspondingly.
This explains the puzzle how a life estate in the grantor can be created
by a juggling of delivery and how parol conditions or reservations may
vary and modify the estates which an instrument purports to create.'
0
It is commonly said in case of the deposit of a deed in escrow to
be delivered to the grantee on performance of some condition that
the instrument has no effect as a deed and passes no interest to the
grantee prior to the second delivery." These statements are mislead-
ing. One must be on his guard to avoid taking the language of the
courts or of the parties too literally. While it is true that deposit in
escrow does not divest the grantor of his "title" it does create a
change in the legal relations between the grantor and the grantee
with reference to the land. If B does nothing, title remains in A.
If B performs the condition, title passes to him. Where the condition
is a future voluntary act of the grantee, the deed creates an irre-
vocable power in the grantee to draw the title out of the grantor.
Where the condition is any other event, the deed creates an irrevocable
conditional interest in the grantee. An escrow prior to the perform-
ance of the condition is therefore not a mere paper like a will before
the death of the testator. It changes legal relations. It is not a mere
draft of a deed or an executory contract to convey, but is a deed
presently with a definite legal operation. Every act necessary to a
complete operative deed must be done by the grantor, who delivers
the escrow deed to a third person subject only to a condition precedent
suspending transfer of the complete and unconditional property
interest.' 2
9Ballantine, When are Deeds Testamentary? (1920) 2 II... L But. 461, 466;
3 Washburn, Real Property (6th ed. 19o2) sec. 2177. By "title," as used here,
is meant that portion of the total "property" known as a vested remainder.
Aigler, Is a Contract Necessary to an Effective Escrow? (1918) 16 MmIC. L.
REV. 569, 586, note ("How a life estate in the grantor can be created by a
juggling of delivery is a question never adequately answered."); Bigelow,
Conditional Deliveries of Deeds of Land (1913) 26 Htv. L. REv. 565, 577;
Tiffany, Conditional Delivery of Deeds (1914) 14 Co.. L. REV. 389, 404-405.
"'Whitney v. Dewey (i9o5) la Ida. 633, 8o Pac. 1117; 3 Washburn, op. cit.,
sees. 2175, 2177.
'Roach v. Malone Co. (1918) 135 Ark. 69, 2o4 S. W. 971; "Delivery must be
so complete that it only remains for the grantee or obligee to perform the condi-
tion or for the event to happen to give the instrument full effect." Schults v.
Schults (x895) 159 Ill. 654, 43 N. E. 8oo; Schmidt v. Frankfort (19o2) 131 Mich.
197, 91 N. W. 131; Davis v. Brigham (91o) 56 Ore. 41, lO7 Pac. 961, Ann. Cas.
19 12B i34o; Nation v. Green (igig, Ind.) 23 N. E. 163. See also ComlsNxrr
(192o) 29 YALE LAW JOuNAL, 549.
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As is said in the oft-quoted passage from Butler & Baker's Case:
"To some intent the second delivery hath relation to the first delivery,
and to some not; and yet, in truth, the second delivery hath all its
force by the first delivery, and the second is but an execution and
consummation of the first.' 2
In fact the second delivery is no part of the delivery at all. When the
condition is performed the depositary becomes the custodian for the
grantee and the deed takes full effect without any formal second
delivery. As the court well says in the case of Craddock V. Barnes,"
"Some courts hold that an escrow does not take effect as a fully
executed deed until there has been a rightful delivery to the grantee;
but the logical position approved in a number of authorities is that
it is effective as a deed when the grantor relinquishes the possession
and control of it by delivery to the depositary, and it passes the title
to the grantee when the condition is fully performed, without the
necessity of a second delivery by the depositarj"15
It is then the performance of the condition and not a second delivery
which is operative to pass title, or rather to render the conditional
interest of the grantee absolute. It is the first delivery which gives the
deed vitality. 'When a deed is delivered as an escrow, it is no longer
revocable by the maker, but will operate to pass title whenever the
condition happens upon which it is to have full effect. The result
then is much the same as where there is an absolute delivery to the
grantee with a condition precedent expressed on the face of the deed-
The courts generally have failed to understad the true nature of
conditional delivery. As Professor Hohfeld has well pointed out in
his notable article on Fundamental Legal Conceptions,
"Fundamentally considered, the typical escrow transaction in which
the performance of conditions is within the volitional control of the
grantee, is somewhat similar to the conditional sale of personalty.. - -
Once the 'escrow' is formed, the grantor still has the legal title; but
the grantee has an irrevocable power to divest that title by perform-
ance of certain conditions (i. e-, the addition of various operative
facts), and concomitantly to vest title in himself. While such power
is outstanding, the grantor is, of course, subject to a cor
liability to have his title divested?"
(,159I, IT B.) 2 Coke, 68."(,9o6) 142 N. C 8, 54 S. F. 1003.
Ibid., 96; see also, Steart v- Stewart 0r824) 5 Cornn- 3117; Canne v-
Handle-y (887) 72 Cali. 133. X3 Pac. 315; Fary %. Palmer (1870) 2 Oh.
St. 223.
(1913) 23 Ya. LAw JouRNAT, x6, 48-49. See, Davis v7. CZ- (1897) 58 Kan.
zoo, 48 Pac. 563; Leifer v. Pike (z889) 127 IlL 287, 326, 2 N. E. 23; Hanter .
Hunter (z8s4, Sup. Ct N. Y.) 17 Barb. 25; Farey v. Palmer, js-pa; Hdon
& Man. R X. v. State (igg, N. Y.) i N. I 2o2; Ames, Lecares on Legal
History (rgxz) 257.
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A by depositing the deed with X in escrow has given B, the grantee,
an irrevocable power to earn or acquire the title by performing the
condition. The deed, perfect on its face and requiring no further act
on the part of the grantor, gives a contingent right to B, which, when
it later vests, may be said to "relate back," so that the purchaser's
title goes back to the date of the original delivery in escrow. He has
a power and the grantor is subject to a liability from the start. In
some degree then, the escrow deed has an immediate operation as a
deed, although its full effect is suspended.' 7
This theory of the nature of delivery in escrow explains the so-called
fiction of relation back by which an escrow deed is held to operate for
certain purposes from the time of its first deposit. Relation back is,
according to this theory, not a fiction at all. It is simply a description
of the fact that the grantee acquires some species of power' or con-
tingent property interest ab initio, which is not affected by subsequent
transactions or events such as death, incapacity, or transfers of title
of the grantor. 8
The grantor as it were holds his estate in fee subject to an executory
limitation. He has the same rights, privileges, etc., in general, as if
he were absolute owner, and the so-called title may be transferred by
his act or by operation of law, subject to the liability of termination in
the hands of the transferee. All persons claiming under the grantor
are likewise subject to the liability created by the conditions of the
escrow, unless protected 'by the recording acts.' 9 The deposit of a
deed in escrow is then a completed legal act, irrevocably operative,
though its full effect as a conveyance is postponed and contingent.
2 0
The performance of the condition by the grantee is a necessary
operative fact, but this is merely as the execution of the power which
vests the "title" or estate. The delivery of the deed has already a
legal operation without it in creating the power.
A very important question in regard to escrows which has been
frequently arising, is whether an escrow arrangement will be revocable
by the grantor unless supported by a binding contract of purchase and
sale. In some states it has been held that it is not necessary that
there should be a previous binding contract to convey.21 It is the
"Hunter v. Hunter, supra, 81, 82; Farley v. Palmer, supra; see COMMENT
(i92o) 29 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 549.
'3 Nolan v. Otnwy (I9O7) 75 Kan. 311, 89 Pac. 69o, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 317;
Davis v. Clark, supra; cf. Tiffany, op. cit., 401.
"Leiter v. Pike, supra; cf., however, May v. Enerson (i9o5) 52 Ore. 262, 96
Pac. io65; Wilkins v. Somerville (i9o7) 8o Vt 48, 66 At]. 893, 13o Am. St. Rep.
9o6, note.
" Chadwick v. Tatem (i89o) 9 Mont 354, 23 Pac. 729; Tiffany, op. cit., 4oi.
"Hall v. Harris (1848) 4o N. C. 303; Farley v. Palmer, supra; Whitfield v.
Harris (2873) 48 Miss. 71o; Dettmer v. Behrens (2898) io6 Iowa, 585, 76 N. W.
853; Tharaldson v. Evarts (i9o2) 87 Minn. i68, 91 N. W. 467.
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view of able writers that this should be the law.2 2 The current of
recent authorities, however, has set strongly in the direction of the
rule-that to uphold an escrow, that is, a delivery upon an uncertain
condition precedent to 'be performed by the grantee, there must be
a concurrent or preExisting contract of sale to make the deposit irrev-
ocable. This doctrine seems to take its rise largely from a California
case followed by a Wisconsin case.23
It is of course true that the conditions upon which a deed is deliv-
ered in escrow may be proved by parol evidence, if there is a valid
binding contract to convey.24 But should any written contract be held
necessary to support an escrow? Is a deposit of a deed in escrow to
be delivered on payment of the price the same in legal effect as a
covenant to execute a deed on payment of the price? Is the effect
of an escrow the same as a contract, merely to vest an equitable
interest in the purchaser, and is giving effect to it by law simply a
legal short-cut to specific performance? This is the theory of
Professor Bigelow.
2 5
A deposit in escrow under an oral contract to convey might be
regarded as a conditional delivery and a performance of a contract
to convey, leaving no executory covenant within the statute of frauds.
But if the interest of the grantee is regarded as depending entirely
upon a contract and the contract is oral, the deed deposited in escrow
will not satisfy the statute of frauds.
2 6
An escrow has been defined as a legal document which is to have
no immediate effect but is only to come into operation upon the con-
dition." An escrow might better be defined as a deed delivered to
a third person upon an oral or extrinsic condition precedent. It
would seem then that the result and operation of escrows should be
much the same as if the condition precedent were expressed in the
deed itself. An escrow should not be held to rest on the obligation
of a contract, but the deed operates without further act or delivery
'Tiffany, op. cit., 389, 398, 452; Aigler, op. cit., 569; see also (1918) 27 YALE
LAw JouRAL, 699.
'Fitch v. Bunch (1855) 30 Calif. 2o8; Campbell v. Thomas (1877) 42 Wis.
466; see also, in accord, Holland v. McCarthy (1916) i73 Calif. 567, I6o Pac.
io6g; McLain v. Healy (1917) 98 Wash. 489, 168 Pac. I, (1918) 27 YAr, LAw
JouRxAi, 699; Seifert v'. Lanz (1914) 29 N. D. 139, 15o N. W. 568; Foulkes v.
Sengstacken (9,7) 84 Ore. 118, 163 Pac. 311; Main v. Pratt (1916) 276 Ill. 218,
114 N. E- 576; Davis v. Brigham, supra; Thomas v. Birch (1918) 178 Calif.
483, 173 Pac. i1O2.
"4 See Osby v. Reynolds (1913) 26o Ill. 576, 1O3 N. E. 556; Manning v. Foster
(9o8) 49 Wash. 541, 96 Pac. 233, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 337, note.
'Bigelow, op. cit., 565; see also, Wyatt v. Meade County Bank (1918) 40 S. D.
111, 166 N. W. 423.
'McLain v. Healy, supra; Kopp v. Reiter (1893) 146 Ill. 437, 34 N. E. 942.
For a criticism of this view see (1918) 27 YAsm LAw JOURNAL, 699.
=Foundling Hospital v. Green [1911] 2 K. B. 567, 573.
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by the grantor or depositary, just as if the condition were expressed in
the deed and the deed delivered direct to the grantee. The delivery
to a third party is, as we have seen, a substitute for the insertion of the
-condition as part of the deed, and operates to create an exception to
the parol evidence rule-
No doubt the courts have been influenced in their present tendency
to require a contract to uphold escrows by an instinctive hostility to
this method of evading the statute of frauds and the parol evidence
rule. There is a strong policy against having contracts and con-
veyances of land rest any more than is necessary in parol, or having
title depend upon the performance of unwritten conditions.ms
In considering escrows the distinction should be noted between con-
ditions which are uncertain because they consist of some voluntary
act of the grantee or obligee, and conditions which are other uncer-
tain events such as the survivorship of the grantee or the act of a
third person The former class is the typical escrow, and creates in
the grantee an irrevocable power by performing the condition to
extinguish the interest of the grantor and create a similar interest
in the grantee, at least in cases where the grantor is under a contract
duty to convey. The second class of conditions is held by some
courts to create a conditional title or interest (not merely a power) in
the grantee; but many courts hold that in such cases there is no
operative delivery at all.9 Thus in Stone v. Dailey2 it was held that
if a deed is handed to a third person who is instructed to keep the
deed until the death of either the grantor or the grantee and then to
deliver it to the survivor, the delivery is not effectual to give life to
the instrument. It is said in Weber v. Brak,3 '
"If a deed be delivered to a third person with the intention that it
shall become operative only upon certain contingencies there is no
delivery. A delivery must be unconditional, unless in escrow. There
can be no partial delivery."
3 2
Thus if delivery to a depositary is conditioned to take effect upon the
grantor's non-recovery from a particular illness or danger, it is said
there is no valid delivery, as the grantor has not parted with control
-of the deed-'
It may be pointed out that the provision that the deed is not to
'Chandoir v- Witt (I919, 'Vis.) 174 N. W. 925; Taft v. Taft, supra; cf.
Molan~ v. Otney supra.
I Campbell . Thomas (1877) 42 Vs. 437; Smith v. Smith, s ura; Stone v.
Dauley (igi, Calif.) 185 Fac.. 665; Weber -v. Brak (Igig) 289 IlL 564, x24
-N. IF 654, (1920) 29 YAxT LAw JouxA1x., 55M-
3a (919) 29 IlL 56, I24 XN. K 654, (92D) 29 YA L-,,w JOURNA, 550.
IVlias v. Danbner (899) 1o3 Vis. 52, 79 N. W.r- 748; Prutsman v. Baker,
Np-ra.
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take effect in the event of the grantee's dying before the grantor, or
recvering from a p iness, does not show that the grantor did
not part with dormn.o and control over the deed The deposit is a
fa accompl, an in-evocable act of conditional devery. In these
casmany c s co se the question wheer tie is to pass at once
wzt the wetheir there is a p delivery. The idea that
the reains c beause tite is to pas only on a contingency
is apueygautn smpi:
An e ie should he held to exist if the grantor has
ea clear i to retain no power over the subsequent
legal off the is By condial delivery the grantor
parts with 2l2f such power, though complete title is to pass only in the
eve of the h of the futureevent or contingncy- This
d between. te transfer of tite on a cerlam and on an uncer-
fa - should not affect the qu - of delivery. The maker
of a d d it with a third party for the grantee may
de laretht it shall have no effect until a -etm time has arrived,
or uni soe unerai continency has hapnd The grantor
shd he b by the delivery in e er as. The condition does
tinm off the dedso as not to transfer complete fitle-. Where the con-
- is an act, however, we have seen that the current
of thokt b& that a coltea cotrc is necessary to make the
it is held thait there is no "valid delivery" at all.
Wre now um to cosdrthe queston off delivery direct to the
gatesubject to aL fuur exrni codtin It is generally held
purptts n it Em to e- acoiplit insrai ex eipt by delivery
to a stz 3eT? The wegh of ff -a however, holds that simple
and eveii ga e n may he delivered to the
face of Butmthe case of edct sa e
dwil M ake fulM effect tipon dirct delivery to the oh- or gzte
Firepa-i of the nenin to -11- it codi-oa Itis sid that
such etra odtospodn ol mf h aeo h ed
'MSMBM~f=- a&4~, 4 4; Mfm p ,I.ck 9-
u.M& W- .rwAU' MP-; JM*,W W- JTAWS (]E923) 67 OMe 4W6 ]US P2,r- nor,
Aim.L Cks. xgrSC W3; Hagl w- Hwy, iwpm The grmss 2t and deduxa-
w-Ji~fe vWipDfflar (3r-qo& rm lraffi, Arr36 N. W. s a6 IL IL A-. (N-. S-)
Jif (r199a Wm) IL74 X W.. 92; Wkw - D lkwz, £am
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and read into it conditions which may operate to affect the title to
realty.37
"Titles would be open to attack at all times, and the practical result
would be to defeat the solemn provisions of a duly executed and
formally delivered deed by parol testimony."
38
In modern English cases this rule has been largely overthrown, and
parol evidence of conditional delivery is allowed as proof that no
simple contract -or deed had in fact been made except upon the parol
condition. The presumption arising from possession of a document
by the obligee or grantee may be overcome by showing that the signed
paper was never intended to be the complete record of the terms of
the existing agreement 3 9 In New York the rule against conditional
delivery to the party himself is confined to instruments relating to title
to real estate.40
This rule is criticized by eminent authority as an arbitrary and
unjust one, that "no reason and no policy justifies it."'. It has been
asserted that this is a striking instance of a survival of a form alistic
doctrine (explained by the relation between delivery of deeds of
conveyance and primitive modes of conveyance) regarding which
English courts have shown a more enlightened view than have courts
on this side.42  These critics go on the assumption that by conditional
delivery no legal act has been consummated till the condition occurs.
This assumption we have seen to be a mistaken, or at least a very
questionable, one. Dean Wigmore speaks of a delivery in escrow as
having "long-been recognized as leaving the act incomplete; though
here it may well be that the document cannot be withdrawn, since
nothing but the condition remains to complete the act."4 3 As Pro-
fessor Corbin4 4 has pointed out, it is unfortunate to speak of the
occurrence of the condition as the completion of any act or utterance
on the part of the grantor or obligor. The delivery of the document
in escrow is an irrevocably completed act. The document is thereby
Bigelow, op. cit., 585; Taft v. Taft, supra.
Chaudoir v. Witt, supra, 925-926.
'Pyn v. Campbell (1856, Q. B.) 6 E. & B. 370, (I919) 28 YALE LAW JouRNAL,
766; Hudson v. Revett (1829, C. P.) 5 Bing. 368.
' Blewitt v. Boorum (1894) i42 N. Y. 357, 37 N. E. iig; Hamlin v. Hamlin,
.supra; Hovey v. Hovey (1917, Sup. Ct.) 17o N. Y. Supp. 822; Higgins v. Ridg-
-Way (1897) 153 N. Y. 130, 47 N. E. 32; cf., Holbrook v. Truesdell (1904) ioo
App. Div. 9, go N. Y. Supp. gii; Doughty v. Weston (i916) i72 App. Div. 905,
i6o N. Y. Supp. 1075.
4' Wigmore, Evidence (1905) sec. 2408; 2 Page, Contracts (2d ed. I92O) sec.
1205.
' (i92o) i8 MIcH. L. Rsv. 314, 316. See also 4 Wigmore, op. cit., secs. 2400-
2408.
4' 4 Wigmore, op. Cit, sec. 2408.
Corbin, Conditions in the Law of Contract (Ig1g) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
739, 765.
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put into effect as an operative instrument, though certain of its legal
effects are subject to a condition precedent. The occurrence of the
condition is not the completion of any act, but simply one of the
operative facts upon which a fully executed instrument is to have
a certain legal effect.45 It has operative effects from the moment of
deposit in escrow or delivery on condition, but the rights given are
rendered conditional by reason of the qualification of the delivery.
An escrow then would seem to be in fact a real exception to the
parol evidence rule that oral testimony will riot be admitted to vary
or to contradict the purport of a legal instrument which has once been
delivered and made operative. The condition, though in form a con-
dition to the existence or binding force of the document, is in reality
a condition to the rights given by the document, a qualification of the
grant. When delivery is intended to give binding force to a deed
without further act or expression of assent by the grantor, then to
incorporate parol conditions does in effect vary and contradict the
terms of the written instrument.41 No further act of the grantor is
needed. No power to control or recall the deed remains in him. To
show the parol conditions makes the transaction rest partly in parol
as to matters which might be expressed on the face of the deed. The
frequent conflict of cases in the same jurisdiction shows the difficulty
which the courts have with the parol evidence rule in its application
to conditional delivery. It is exceedingly difficult to draw the line
between conditional delivery, non-delivery, and collateral contract.
There is great confusion in the cases dealing with the effect of
delivery of a deed to the grantee to take effect at the death of the
grantor. In Mowry v. Heney4 7 an absolute deed of certain property
was delivered to the grantee upon an understanding that the deed
was not to be operative in event of recovery of the grantor from a
certain illness. The grantor recovered, but the deed was held an
absolute conveyance, operative from the first, without regard to the
understanding or intention of the parties. Works, J., applied the
traditional rule which refuses to recognize delivery in escrow to the
grantee. He held that it would be a dangerous violation of the parol
evidence rule to allow proof that the deed was delivered to the
grantee to take effect upon the happening of a future contingency;
and that an absolute deed which has been delivered to the grantee,
cannot have its operation defeated by parol proof of an intention on
the part of the grantor, known to the grantee, that it should not take
effect except in event of the grantor's death. McFarland, J., dissented
on the ground that there was no delivery at all. The case of Mowry
'Norman v. McCarthy (1913) 56 Colo. 290, 138 Pac. 28; Riley v. International
Co. (9r4) i85 Ill. App. 629; see Aigler, op. cit., 314.
" Ordinary of New Jersey v. Thatcher (1879) 41 N. J. L. 403, 32 Am. Rep.
225; Tiffany, op. cit., 405.
"I (i89o) 86 Calif. 471, 25 Pac. iT.
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v. Heney has been followed by the California court in some other
cases including Hammond v. McCollough.,' in which it was held that
delivery of a deed from one spouse to another, with the understanding
that it was to be destroyed on the grantee's dying fir5t would be given
strict legal effect as absolutely vesting title in the gantee, It is not
competent to prove by parol an agreement contrary to the plain import
of the instrument, or that it is to have effect only on some condition
or conbngency .
It is difficult to harmonize with these cases the holding in Kenney
v. Parks. e In this case a wife gave her husband two deeds under the
representation and belief that they would not be valid until recorded,
and upon her husband's promise that he would not record them unless
he survived her. He recorded them nevertheless, and in a suit by the
wife to recover the pro t it was held that there had not b a
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regarded as absolute. The deed, though limited by parol to take
effect only upon the death of the father, went into effect at once. In
Elliott v. Murray a deed was signed and acknowledged by the wife
and handed over to her husband, the grantee, who placed it in his
private box where it remained until after her death. It was made
with the intention that it should take effect only in case the grantee
survived the grantor; and in the event that the wife should survive
him, it was never to take effect bht was to be destroyed. The wife
died first in the Iroquois Theater disaster. It was held that the
possession of the deed by the grantee did not operate to vest title
to the land in him. It was urged that such delivery of the deed
should be held to invest him with title regardless of the intention of
the parties, on the ground that a deed cannot be delivered to the
grantee in escrow. It was held, however, that the parol condition
precedent defeated delivery entirely. "A deed must take effect
immediately upon its execution and delivery to the grantee or it will
not take effect at all."
60
We accordingly find that in some cases the courts hold that condi-
tional delivery is incomplete delivery and the condition precedent
postponing the transfer of title until some future event negatives
delivery entirely. There is said to be no delivery where the grantor
did not intend that the title should presently and unconditionally pass
to the grantee!" In other cases where the court finds that there was
an "actual delivery" of the deed to the grantee, it is held that title
will pass at once notwithstanding a verbal understanding that the
deed was to take effect on, or be subject to, certain parol conditions."8 2
The act of delivery and the physical document are some of the
operative facts. Both are essential to affect legal relations. There
is obviously some inherent difficulty to incorporate in the deed itself
evidence of its own delivery. Delivery is the final expression by word
or act of assent to the instrument as the deed or contract of the
party. The doctrine that there can be no delivery in escrow to the
grantee or obligee is not a mere survival of the primitive doctrine
that intent is immaterial so long as there is the physical act of sur-
render of the instrument. 3  The problem is a difficult and baffling
one. May there be a partial delivery, and may the extent to which
1 (19o6) 225 Ill. 107, 112, 8o N. E. 77.
'Phelps v. Pratt (19o6) 225 II. 85, 91, 8o N. E. 69, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 945;
Weber v. Brak, supra; Stanley v. White (1896) i6o Ill. 6o5, 43 N. E. 729;
Roundtree v. Smith (1894) 152 Ill. 493, 38 N. E. 68o; Price v. Hudson (1888)
125 Ill. 284, 287, 17 N. E. 817; Diebold Safe etc. v. Morse, supra.
' Blake v. Ogden, supra; Baker v. Baker, supra; Ryan v. Cooke (1898) 172 Ill.
302, 5o N. E. 217; see Riley v. International, etc. Co., supra; Reed v. Reed
(918) 117 Me. 281, lO4 Atl. 227, (1919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 766.
"Cf. i Williston, Contracts (192o) seC. 21o; Aigler, op. cit., 314; Tiffany,
op. cit., 390, 391.
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the instrument shall become binding be limited by a condition attend-
ing its delivery? The effect of delivery depends on an oral expres-
sion of intent and the intent expressed may 'be qualified or conditional
on future events. The true function of delivery, however, is to
declare that a written instrument shall be presently operative, not
to prescribe the estates which the instrument shall grant whether
vested or contingent, present or future. Such provisions may well
be required to be incorporated in the deed itself. How far can you
juggle with delivery to make the operation of a deed which purports
to be absolute conditional only? Shall you allow the grantor, under
the guise of qualifying delivery, in effect to incorporate provisions
in the deed which vary its legal effect?
In order to supply tangible evidence of the qualification imposed
on the delivery, the common law has attempted to require, at least in
the case of deeds, delivery to a third person, under penalty of hold-
ing direct delivery to the grantee not conditional but absolute. If
a deed is delivered upon condition to the grantee or obligee himself,
extrinsic evidence of the condition conflicts with the strong presump-
tion of absolute delivery arising from possession of the document.1
4
If the instrument is delivered to a third party, this supplies both direct
and circumstantial evidence of the qualification placed upon the deliv-
ery. It withholds from the grantee the evidence of his right. It
marks a qualification upon the acquisition of rights, privileges, etc.,
by him. It provides a third party as witness or stakeholder, who is
supposedly a more or less indifferent person as between the grantor
and grantee.
The law has the uncomfortable choice among three alternatives:
(i) either to say there is no delivery, as some cases do; or (2)
to hold that delivery is absolute, as other cases do; or (3) to give
effect to the conditions, as most courts do in the case of documents
not under seal. This choice cannot be made as a dry matter of logical
deduction as to whether you can get around the parol evidence rule,
but involves a question of policy. Which alternative on the whole
is preferable,-to hold the grantor to something to which he never
assented, or to defeat the transaction entirely, or to allow the condi-
tion and permit contracts and conveyances to depend on the memory
and truthfulness of witnesses as to matters which ought to be incor-
porated in the instrument? There is no solution of the problem that
is satisfactory under our present system of conveyancing. None of
these alternatives will carry out the intent of the parties and at the
same time preserve the stability of legal transactions. Since it is
necessary to go into parol evidence anyway, it would seem preferable
to give effect to the parol condition and make the law of deeds and
" McCann v. Atherton (1883) io6 Ill. 3.
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